Losing Harvard's Billions

Losing Harvard's Billions

The world’s biggest endowment may have lost more than it’s previously stated.

Posted Tuesday, January 27, 2009 - 4:18pm

Harvard Management Co., which runs the world's largest endowment fund, has had until recently an incredible record. Over the past six years, it succeeded in more than doubling the notional value of Harvard's endowment to $36.9 billion in fiscal 2008 (which ended on June 30) even after paying for about one-third of Harvard's operating expenses. So its recent loss of $8.1 billion from July 1 to Oct. 31, 2008, came as a stunning blow. Yet this huge loss, as staggering as it sounds, might be only the tip of the iceberg of illiquid investments. According to a source close to the Harvard Management Co., the damage, if the fund's illiquid investments are realistically appraised, may be closer to $18 billion—or more than twice the amount previously reported. (This is in line with a report, released today, showing an average 22.5 percent drop in endowments in North America.)

The lack of clarity says a lot about how exotic Harvard's finances have become. Its team of highly incentivized money managers—who themselves earned $26.8 million in 2008—adopted a strategy aimed at taking maximum advantage of an inflationary global boom in the early 2000s by shifting the lion's share of Harvard's money from conventional endowment assets—such as bonds, preferred stocks, Treasury bills, and cash—into more esoteric investments that would presumably rise as more money chased after scarcer goods. They bought, for example, oil in storage tanks, timber forests, and farmlands. As the proliferation of trillions of dollars worth of subprime mortgages further expanded the bubble, driving up the price of oil, lumber, and land, the notional value of Harvard's portfolio soared.

The price of oil, for example, which Harvard and other speculators were storing, more than quadrupled to $153 a barrel on commodity exchanges, allowing Harvard to hugely appreciate the notional value of its portfolio. So between fiscal 2003 and 2008, Harvard's "real assets" showed a gain of nearly 25 percent annually. But even after the subprime mortgage crisis began to unfold and a number of financial institutions had collapsed, Harvard's money managers persisted in pursuing this risky course.

Consequently, as late as June 2008, the fund kept almost no reserve of cash or Treasury bills and allocated a mere 6 percent of its money to fixed-interest bonds. It also borrowed more than $1 billion to amplify the returns on its less conventional investments. So by the time the bubble burst in the fall of 2008, only a small fraction of the endowment fund investment was even under the jurisdiction of the SEC. According to the November 7th 13F holding report it filed with the SEC for the quarter ending September 30th, 2008, Harvard had only $2.88 billion of its funds in exchange-listed stocks, options, or other derivatives. What of the more than $35 billion it had allocated to investments at the start of fiscal 2009 (i.e., July 2008)? Most of the balance had been allocated to investments, which if not totally illiquid could not be valued by market activity. The breakdown that follows illuminates how far HMC had strayed from the path of traditional endowment investing in the last decade.

More than one-quarter of Harvard's funds were still sunk in "real assets": about 8 percent in stockpiled oil, about 9 percent in timber and other agricultural land, and 9 percent in real estate participation. Then came the financial crises, and prices plunged. Oil fell to less than $40 a barrel. Lumber suffered almost as badly. And, with the drying up of bank lending, the value of Harvard's real estate holdings—which remain opaque—became at best problematic. One indication of how steep the loss may be is that CalPERS, the giant pension fund of the California Public Employees' Retirement System, which owned even more real estate acreage than Harvard, reported in this period a 103 percent loss on real estate deals in which, like Harvard, it had borrowed to amplify its profits.

Another huge portion of Harvard's endowment had been farmed out to hedge funds (18 percent) and private equity funds (13 percent). While these funds provided some diversification, many of them also impose restrictions on withdrawals, including ones, like Citadel, that suffered substantial losses. To get back its money under such circumstance, it was often necessary to sell at a steep discount to a "secondary" hedge fund. One major player in the private equity business tells me that Harvard had tried this fall to sell its private equity stakes at 30 percent to 35 percent discounts but could find no buyers even at those prices. It's also possible that Harvard will have to meet "capital calls" on its private equity investments that would sap even more capital.

  • Edward Jay Epstein is the author of The Big Picture: The New Logic of Money and Power in Hollywood.

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Top post. I look forward to

Top post. I look forward to reading more. Cheers

 

 

Summers fired Derivatives whistleblower at Harvard Management Co

Harvard alum Iris Mack, MBA/PhD communicated with Larry Summers (former Harvard President and current Obama economic advisor) to express her concerns about how her Harvard Management Company (HMC) boss Jeff Larson used derivatives to manage an HMC portfolio. Larson eventually left HMC to start Sowood hedge fund with hundreds of millions of dollars of Harvard alums' donations. Sowood was one of the first hedge funds to blow up during the subprime mortgage derivatives crisis. Dr. Mack communicated with Summers' office regarding such derviatives trades. Perhaps, she could have saved Harvard alums hundreds of millions of dollars if Summers had bothered to continue to hear her out before forcing her resignation. There is a wealth of information describing this derivatives whistleblowing case: correspondence between Dr. Mack and Summer's office (emails, faxes, snail mail, phone records, etc.); legal documents; reports from FBI and DOJ interviews, etc. Given all this, you have to wonder whether Summers was either too (a) corrupt and wanted to coverup up something(s) at HMC. (b) arrogant to think that Dr. Mack had anything of value to tell him about mathematical finance and derivatives. Please recall Summers' comments about women and math. Also, please note that Dr. Mack has a doctorate in Applied Mathematics from Harvard and a Sloan Fellows MBA from London Business School. (c) incompetent to understand what Dr. Mack was trying to warn him about regarding derivatives trades in HMC portfolios. Did Summers try to silence Dr. Mack the way he, Rubin and Greenspan tried to silence Attorney Brooksley Born of the CFTC.

Endowment

Could you do some elementary arithmetic for the mathematically challenged? Suppose Harvard put all its endowment in T-bills in 2000, or in an S&P index fund, or in TIAA, and therefore had no or little management costs. Would it be better off today than it is with the exotic investment strategy it employed? If the answer is no, then your expose collapses like a house of cards.

Summers

Interestingly enough old Lawrence Summers name pops up again as a member of the Harvard Corporation. This corporation manages the Harvard Endowment. http://www.uni-muenster.de/PeaCon/global-texte/g-b/Harvard/Harvard-Corp.htm Rubin was also a memeber of that Board. As One Blogger put it: "Harvard has had a peculiar recent history that one would expect to destabilize its endowment more than others. I used the term "super-egoed-economist" above to refer to Larry Summers' indisputably huge ego, but that doesn't mean he knows what he's doing as a policy maker or administrator. Summers helped create the bubble in the national economy and came back to Harvard to create bubbles in biomedical research (as though the NIH budget would double indefinitely) and to foist brobdingnagian, unaffordable expansion plans in general. But basic infrastructure, such as House and athletic facilities, were left unrenewed and faculty salaries merely rose with a vague inflation number. Summers has presided over more bubbles than Lawrence Welk, and is a man of a yesterday that never really was. Yale has never had a Summers, and that's a very good thing. But Robert Rubin has been a bigger source of problems for Harvard than Summers has, much better at evading the consequences of his own incompetence and, most important, HE'S STILL THERE. Rubin was a prime mover in elevating Summers to both Secretary of the Treasury and the Harvard presidency. Once in office, Summers elevated Rubin to the Corporation along with others and the Summers-nominated Corporation, in turn, authorized the University policies that Summers attempted to effect. That attempt brought down his presidency, leaving both Harvard and its endowment company the divided, undermanaged messes they are today. Aside from Summers' replacement, the same Corporation is in office today."

Re: Harvard Corporation

Actually, Summers is not on the Corporation any longer. The President is a member of the Corporation, and Summers' term on that body ended when he stepped down as President. The roster that run75441 refers to is out of date. For the current roster, go to http://www.news.harvard.edu/guide/underst/index.html . If you compare the lists, you'll see that Rubin and James Houghton are the only two holdovers still on the Corporation. Also, the Corporation does not directly manage the endowment. The endowment is managed by the Harvard Management Company, which reports to the Corporation. For info on HMC, go to http://www.hmc.harvard.edu/ .

Harvard's Financial Crisis

This gross greed on the part of the over paid money managers and the Harvard corporation, who should have had some oversight of the situation, will have devastating consequences on the lives of many Harvard employees. Despite the fact that there is still a large endowment, the corporation has tightened the belt and many departments are taking substantial cuts to their budgets. Many of us average Harvard employees will be losing our jobs over the coming months. All because some team of money managers were anxious to fatten their own wallets, and decided to take risks with money that did not belong to them. When did the American people start expecting to make money hand over fist by doing nothing more than having money. What happened to the idea of working hard, having morals and ethics, and making sensible well researched investments and expecting a reasonable return on that. We are bankrupt in more than one way.

Harvard Fund

"Its team of highly incentivized money managers—who themselves earned $26.8 million in 2008" Therein lies the problem - greedy academics using computer logic - look behind their curtain, then hang 'em high!

Long term investing horizon

While Harvard may have been a bit too aggressive in their bets (or too greedy in not selling assets at the peak), the fact remains that endowments such as Harvard's have a time horizon that is well beyond that of the average investor or instution, allowing them greater flexability and less stress during times of crisis. Harvard is comfortable locking up capital for 10+ years, and as long as they have liquidity to get them over the current hump, they will likely see appreciation on many of the positions they took in the 2000s. While the year to year variation in asset prices for many 'hard assets' such as oil, timber, etc. are extremely volatile, the long term (10+ year) prospects for these investments remains robust. The fact Harvard bought in the early 2000s means they're probably still showing a paper gain, just down from the peak. Investments in volatile emerging markets will also likely to be profitable on a 10-20 year time horizon. HMC has always been a trail blazer with regards to endowment management, and don't be so quick to renounce their managers as incompetent. HMC will live to fight another day.

Our nation's brain trust

Sounds like our top universities' brain trusts were trusting in risky business instead of prudent economic research to base the economic future of their organizations. Greed has a way of overcoming good sense with dreams of megabucks - no matter how smart or educated people may think they are. The best economists, Phd's and so called market experts failed to see the economic collapse coming even though there were dire predictors of the impending bursting of the housing bubble. Their sheepskins are as worthless as their portfolios.

CLAWBACK

I hope they have a clawback for the overpayment of their fund managers. As a graduate I was startled by receiving a dunning letter from President Faust then an announcement of retrenchment. The endowment should allow for counter cyclic spending - they can spend down and still operate. Let's see some real leadership here!

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